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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SEARCH FOR A “NEW” RHETORIC OF THE 
LEFT: A LOOK AT STRATEGIES OF THE 
DEMOCRATS AND LABOUR 
LORI MAGUIRE 
 
A great deal of attention has been devoted to the electoral problems 
experienced by the left of centre parties in both Great Britain and the 
United States in recent times. This provoked a search by a number of 
prominent figures on both sides of the Atlantic, as to the reasons for these 
difficulties and to develop a new rhetoric that would appeal more to the 
voters. The academic Alan Finlayson has commented perceptively on the 
importance of words in politics: 
 
At the very least we have to acknowledge that politics under democratic 
constitutions is about some people trying to persuade the rest of us of their 
virtues or the virtues of their political position. To do so, they employ 
rhetoric intended to illustrate the ways in which their political programme 
will be good for us by, for example, associating it with positive ends and 
characteristics. Anyone who has had any involvement in a political 
organisation or campaign knows that a central aspect of such activity is the 
strategic one of trying to find ways in which to connect with the wider 
public through various images, modes of speech and so forth.1 
 
In its essence, political communication is about finding an appealing 
message and effectively conveying it to the public through the mass 
media. We will be examining here how leading figures in the two major 
leftwing parties of the U.S. and the U.K. analysed their repeated defeats of 
the 1980s (and, in the case of Labour, early 1990s) drawing from this 
certain conclusions in order to construct (they hoped) a more effective 
rhetoric and image. 
Although a number of dissimilarities exist between the two parties, 
both the Democrats and Labour began their quest at the same time: 
Labour‟s after its election defeat of 1983 and the Democrats after 
Reagan‟s landslide victory in 1984. In both cases they achieved some 
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success afterwards with Bill Clinton‟s election in 1992 and Labour‟s 
triumph in 1997. In neither case have they completely replaced older 
terminology and, indeed, there has been some return to it recently. We will 
begin by briefly examining the traditions of the two parties, and then 
analyse the reasons why many on the Left believed that this 
“modernisation”, as they termed it, was necessary. After this, we will 
examine the rhetoric of the “new” Left, also known as “triangulation” or 
the “Third Way” before taking a short look at recent trends. 
The Democratic Party of the United States and Britain‟s Labour Party 
differ in certain fundamental ways. To begin with, the Democratic Party is 
much older and traces its ancestry back to the early days of the Republic. 
After a long and varied history it only firmly became the party of the Left 
with Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. Class-based rhetoric had not 
been absent from American politics before Roosevelt but he linked it to 
phenomenal political success. To some extent, Roosevelt‟s Depression era 
speeches qualify as rhetoric of war for he frequently used military 
vocabulary, although not directly linked to questions of class. For 
example, in his first inaugural address, he talked about “the great army of 
our people dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems”.2 
He frequently made attacks on the wealthy but, once again, avoided overt 
class language, talking of the “rulers of the exchange of mankind‟s goods” 
or the “unscrupulous moneychangers”.3 Perhaps the best summary of 
Roosevelt‟s ideas is contained in his speech to the Democratic National 
Convention in July 1932 in which he announced the New Deal. Roosevelt 
said: “My program… is based upon this simple moral principle: the 
welfare and the soundness of the nation depend first upon what the great 
mass of the people wish and need; and second, whether or not they are 
getting it.”4 Instead of “capitalists” or even “the rich” or “the workers”, 
Roosevelt preferred to attack particular types of the wealthy and to 
champion the people. Instead of ideology, pragmatism. 
Roosevelt turned the Democratic Party into an umbrella organization 
linking the have-nots to the middle class and performed –at a cost –the 
extraordinary achievement of gaining the support both of southern blacks 
and low-income southern whites. A 1936 Gallup poll showed that, while 
42 percent of wealthy voters supported him, the percentage rose to 60 
percent among middle-income voters and 76 percent among those in lower 
income groups. Added to that, 80 percent of trade unionists, 81 percent of 
unskilled workers and 84 percent of those on relief went for the 
Democratic Party.
5
 All political parties are coalitions but that of the New 
Deal, although overwhelmingly successful in its time, was so broad and 
included so many conflicting interests that it was extraordinarily fragile. 
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This meant that it could not be too radical and that it could splinter fairly 
easily. Its fragmentation began in earnest in the 1960s as civil rights, the 
Vietnam War and growing prosperity, began to push its members apart. 
In contrast, the Labour Party officially began life only in 1900 and was 
from the start a consciously class-based party. It was formed from a 
variety of left-wing organizations including co-operative groups, socialist 
groups, and trade unions, among others, and began life as the Labour 
Representation Committee, changing its name in 1906 to the Labour Party. 
Class-based rhetoric was thus a major element in the party‟s presentation 
of itself from the start, one of its first manifestos declaring that: 
 
The House of Commons is supposed to be the People‟s House, and yet the 
people are not there. Landlords, employers, lawyers, brewers, and 
financiers are there in force. Why not Labour?6 
 
While this rhetoric is stronger than Roosevelt‟s, it does not differ that 
much fundamentally. Note how the word “people” is used rather than a 
specific class term and how particular groups of the wealthy are 
denounced rather than the entire class. Neither here nor in Roosevelt‟s 
speeches is wealth itself condemned but the abuse of wealth and power by 
specific groups. There is an undoubted rejection of Marxist rhetoric here 
and a belief in the basic soundness of the economic and social system 
which need only reform. The Labour party‟s leaders were always aware of 
the need to attract middle class voters if they wished to have a majority, 
and so official party rhetoric was usually restrained.  In an in-depth 
analysis of the 1945 Labour victory, American political scientist, William 
Newman, came to the conclusion that Labour was “not a class party”. He 
observed that; “If the Labour Party depends mainly on the industrial 
sections of the country for seats it nevertheless succeeds or fails 
proportionately in all the economic areas of the country.” In fact, he found 
this to be true of all political parties and insisted that Labour is “a 
genuinely national party”.7 It must be emphasized, though, that historically 
the rhetoric of the Left has been more moderate in the U.S. than in Britain 
for the Labour Party openly embraced the word “socialism”–at least until 
the late 1980s. This term was never used in mainstream American politics 
except by Republicans seeking to discredit their opponents. The Labour 
Party is also a member of the Socialist International which is not the case 
of the Democratic Party. 
The 1970s and 1980s were a critical time for the Left in both nations. 
Both the Democrats and Labour suffered a similar crisis at approximately 
the same time. In America this reached a high point with the disastrous 
candidacy of George McGovern for president in 1972. The voters 
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decisively rejected his program, widely seen as advocating too generous 
social policies while being far too weak in foreign policy (although it must 
be said that there was no such rejection of the party at the congressional 
level).
8
 In Britain the crisis reached its zenith later, during Michael Foot‟s 
tenure as Labour leader from 1979 to 1983. Under Foot, who had a few 
years earlier talked of “the red flame of socialist courage”, the party 
moved to the left and also paid a heavy price both within itself and at the 
ballot box, as we shall see.  
Similar factors have been put forward to explain this decline in 
popularity, most notably the economic problems of this period which 
provoked a strong critique of Keynesianism on the Right; a reaction to the 
social and cultural upheavals of the 1960s; the growth of the middle class 
and of a “property-owning democracy” and changing demographics due to 
increasingly suburban population concentrations. Clear evidence exists for 
the growth of swing voters in both countries. But some have diagnosed the 
cause as being simply the fracturing of the coalition that sustained each 
party around certain common policies that had now been put into effect. 
Everybody wanted “progress” but there was a problem agreeing on what 
direction the “progress” should take. As early as 1955, the Labour 
politician Richard Crossman said his party was being “ideologically 
disintegrated”. Because of the success of “Keynesian welfare capitalism”, 
there was no longer much of a demand for socialism: 
 
All this happens to the Labour Party because people in Britain are more 
prosperous and more contented and because peace is breaking out all over 
the world. We suddenly feel that our mission to save people from 
cataclysm and disaster has come unstuck. We are missionaries without a 
mission, or missionaries more and more dubious about the mission.9 
 
One of the problems the Left has encountered in both nations has been this 
need to find a “mission” that would motivate its rank and file and get the 
support of the electorate. But over the next few years this proved 
extremely difficult and, as loss piled on loss, the drive to win elections 
overwhelmed any missionary zeal.
10
 
In the case of the United States, the 1970s saw a reorganisation of the 
electoral map. In part this was because of population shifts from the 
traditionally Democratic regions of the Midwest and Northeast to the more 
Republican leaning Sunbelt. But a number of other Democratic areas 
became, often in a relatively short period of time, Republican dominated. 
The classic example is the South which shifted its allegiance, to a large 
extent, because of racial questions. Pres. Lyndon Johnson was fully aware 
that this would happen when he signed the Civil Rights Act and the Voting 
New Rhetoric of the Left                                              5 
 
Rights Act. He had been warned that this legislation “will not only cost 
you the South, it will cost you the election.”11 Added to this, Johnson 
attempted to have both guns and butter: funding both the Vietnam War and 
the Great Society, which led to higher taxes and contributed to growing 
inflation and other economic problems. And this, in turn, helped the 
Republicans to pin the label “tax and spend” on their opponents. 
Furthermore, Kevin Phillips, a conservative political analyst, published 
The Emerging Republican Majority in 1969. He argued that, if the 
Republicans stressed support for traditional cultural and social values and 
opposition to a big government agenda–now linked in many people‟s 
minds to racial questions–then they could form a new majority to govern 
the country. Also in 1969, Newsweek did an examination of “Troubled 
America” which published the results of a scientific survey showing that 
almost 80 percent of middle-class Americans thought that, on average, 
members of racial minorities on welfare had chosen not to work.
12
 These 
and other observations had a profound effect on the Republican Party. In 
that same year Richard Nixon made a determined appeal to the, as he 
called it, “Silent Majority”–those who did not oppose the Vietnam War, 
participate in protest rallies or belong to the counterculture. To attract this 
“silent majority”, Nixon and others attacked court-ordered busing and 
called for stronger law enforcement procedures.  
Later, Ronald Reagan developed similar themes, using language that, 
while not overtly racist, contained terms that summoned up, in some 
people‟s minds, a negative image of blacks and other minorities. His 
attack on “welfare queens” (a story that was largely fictitious) and 
affirmative action programs and his wish to reduce spending on social 
programs while increasing crime fighting capabilities, appealed to many 
whites who considered that African Americans were disproportionately 
taking advantage of the welfare state–while, at the same time, being the 
main perpetrators of crime. Furthermore, the Republican Right showed a 
remarkable gift for caricaturing liberalism, taunting the Democrats as 
having only one policy: “tax and spend”. In this way, it has been argued, 
the Republicans split the traditional class-based Democratic coalition.
13
 
Recent work has tended to criticise this theory as too simplistic and to 
stress the role of class. For one thing, it does not explain the situation of 
states like Kansas, which has a radical past and possesses a negligible 
black population, but has voted Republican in every presidential election 
since 1948, with the exception of 1964, often by large majorities. Nor does 
it explain that the South was not so solidly Democratic before 1965, with 
at least four states lacking a Democratic majority in every election from 
1948. Matthew Lassiter, in his book, The Silent Majority: Suburban 
6                                                 Chapter Three 
 
Politics in the Sunbelt South, argues against a purely race-based 
interpretation and places greater emphasis on class. He shows how a 
technically race-neutral language developed to further middle-class aims: 
 
The color-blind and class-driven discourse popularized in the Sunbelt 
South helped create a suburban blueprint that ultimately resonated from the 
conservative subdivisions of Southern California to the liberal townships 
of New England: a bipartisan political language of private property values, 
individual taxpayer rights, children‟s educational privileges, family 
residential security and white racial innocence.14 
 
Lassiter links many of the changes in southern voting patterns to more 
general changes in the US as a whole, which he sees, in turn, as related to 
the expansion of suburban America. 
This, of course, is also connected to the growth of the middle class. 
The late 1940s saw the beginning of a massive demographic shift from 
rural and urban America towards the suburbs. It also saw an enormous 
growth in universities and in the number of students. Both of these 
changes came about, to a large extent, because of the G.I. Bill which 
provided assistance to veterans. The prosperity of the 1950s continued the 
evolution towards a largely middle class America with a relatively small 
group living in poverty–and a large percentage of this group consisting of 
blacks and immigrants.
15
 The Democratic Party shows a complex inter-
relationship between class, race and geography that makes it difficult for it 
to find a presidential candidate who pleases voters in all these divisions.
16
 
In any case, by the mid-1980s, the Democratic Party was demoralized 
by its failure to win presidential elections (its decline at the Congressional 
and state levels was considerably less drastic), having lost every election 
since 1968, except for that of 1976. The 1972 presidential campaign had 
been the nadir of Democratic prospects with the resounding defeat of 
George McGovern and his liberal platform. Most Democratic 
commentators saw this as a decisive rejection of the leftwing, although, as 
Bruce Miroff has shown, McGovern‟s impact on the party, although rarely 
talked about, has been surprisingly strong. A large number of the party‟s 
leaders since then were involved in one way or another in that campaign.
17
 
Jimmy Carter, the next Democratic presidential candidate turned away 
from this legacy, positioning himself in the centre. Add to this the fact that 
many of its leaders were also aware of the demographic changes we have 
previously outlined and interpreted the triumphant popularity of Reagan as 
evidence that America had moved to the right. The old, traditional, class-
based rhetoric of the New Deal had, for many, become associated with 
minority groups and a number of people judged it, therefore, to be counter-
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productive. Certainly Michael Dukakis, Democratic presidential candidate 
in 1988, tried to distance himself from these themes, basing his campaign 
around the so-called “Massachusetts Miracle”–the reinvigoration of the 
Massachusetts economy during his time as governor. The Republicans, 
however, worked to paint Dukakis in highly negative colours as a “tax and 
spend” liberal, weak on crime.18 The failure of Dukakis to hit back 
effectively and overcome the image given to him by Republican loyalists 
convinced even more Democrats that they had to change the way the party 
was seen and to establish a quick and effective response to such attacks in 
the future.  
Already in 1985, several, mainly southern, Democrats had formed the 
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC).
19
 The DLC argued that the 
Republicans were winning because they had successfully portrayed the 
Democrats as a party dominated by narrow interest groups like radical 
feminists, gay rights or ethnic minorities and thus out of touch with the 
mainstream of America. This, in turn, led to a philosophy of “tax and 
spend” which benefitted these minority groups to the disadvantage of the 
majority. DLC leaders argued that the Democrats had to change the public 
philosophy of their party. The Democratic Party had to find a way to 
reconnect with the majority of the nation. As Sam Nunn, one of its 
founders, put it: “We are going to try to move the party–both in substance 
and perception–back into the mainstream of American political life.”20 
Part of this would mean downplaying the federal government as an engine 
for reform and emphasizing instead the private sector, local and state 
governments. Although they certainly do not agree with Reagan‟s 
statement that the federal government “is the problem”, the DLC prefers 
the use of market mechanisms rather than federal bureaucracies to 
implement policy. In 1990, the DLC published a statement of its basic 
beliefs: 
 
We believe the Democratic Party's fundamental mission is to expand 
opportunity, not government… We believe that economic growth is the 
prerequisite to expanding opportunity for everyone. The free market, 
regulated in the public interest, is the best engine of general 
prosperity…We believe the purpose of social welfare is to bring the poor 
into the nation's economic mainstream, not to maintain them in 
dependence.21 
 
Bill Clinton, one of its founders, described the DLC‟s goals as “forging a 
winning message for the Democrats based on fiscal responsibility, creative 
new ideas on social policy, and a commitment to a strong national 
defense”.22 It also sent out a strong message on crime.   
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The problem now, as the DLC saw it, was to convince the electorate 
that they had a different and original message. Their solution was a 
vocabulary of change, with repeated use of words like “change” and 
“modern” while at the same time implying that their programme would be 
a return to an idealized past, linked to the Democratic Party,  that 
contained the true values of the nation: 
 
In keeping with our party's grand tradition, we share Jefferson's belief in 
individual liberty and responsibility. We endorse Jackson's credo of equal 
opportunity for all, and special privileges for none. We embrace 
Roosevelt's thirst for innovation, and Truman's sense in the uncommon 
sense of common men and women. We carry on Kennedy's summons to 
civic duty and public service, Johnson's passion for social justice, and 
Carter's commitment to human rights.23 
 
At the same time, the word “class” appeared repeatedly but only in 
connection with the word “middle”. Terms traditionally associated with 
conservatism were also appropriated, such as “choice”, “opportunity” and 
“responsibility”.  
In 1990, Bill Clinton, then governor of Arkansas, became chair of the 
DLC and, in an important speech in May 1991, outlined a number of his 
ideas. After examining the problems facing the U.S., in particular in 
relation to education, salary levels, health care and job insecurity, Clinton 
said: 
 
You may say, well if all these things are out there, why in the world 
haven‟t the Democrats been able to take advantage of these conditions? 
I‟ll tell you why: because too many of the people that used to vote for 
us, the very burdened middle class we are talking about, have not 
trusted us in national elections to defend our national interests abroad, 
to put their values into our social policy at home, or to take their tax 
money and spend it with discipline. We have got to turn these 
perceptions around, or we cannot continue a national party.24 
 
In effect, he accepts the Republican, and notably Reaganite, criticisms of 
the party as valid and, in so doing, gives them greater force. Democratic 
programs have been responsible for Democratic losses because they have 
lost touch with the majority of Americans by focussing too much on the 
have-nots and not enough on the middle class, described here as 
“burdened”–an obvious acceptance of right-wing critiques of past 
Democratic policy on taxation. 
He was even more clear in the announcement of his candidacy for the 
presidency in October 1991: 
New Rhetoric of the Left                                              9 
 
 
All of you, in different ways, have brought me here today, to step 
beyond a life and a job I love, to make a commitment to a larger cause: 
preserving the American Dream… restoring the hope of the forgotten 
middle class…reclaiming the future of our children. I refuse to be part 
of a generation that celebrates the death of Communism abroad with 
the loss of the American Dream at home.25 
 
Here we can see the link with an idealized heritage through the use of 
“American Dream”. Words like “restore” and “reclaim” illustrate this 
decline from past glories. The future of the nation is in jeopardy: America 
has won the Cold War only to be at risk of losing the peace. Note also the 
term “forgotten middle class” that obviously echoes Nixon‟s famous 
reference to the “silent majority”. They have lost hope although why is not 
entirely clear. Later in the speech, he called for a “new covenant to rebuild 
America” which clothes the social contract idea in a typically American 
religious dress. He also argued that “government‟s responsibility is to 
create more opportunity. The people‟s responsibility is to make the most 
of it.”  Clinton developed this theme further, using his own life as an 
example. After talking about the poverty of his mother and grandparents, 
he said: 
 
But we didn‟t blame other people. We took responsibility for ourselves 
and for each other because we knew we could do better. I was raised to 
believe in the American Dream, in family values, in individual 
responsibility, and in the obligation of government to help people who 
were doing the best they could. 
 
Most of the terms used here are traditionally associated with certain 
strands of rightwing thought, notably “responsibility” (repeated twice), the 
“individual” and, a more recent addition, “family values”. He does, of 
course, talk about “the obligation of government” but this is clearly limited 
only to those “who were doing the best they could”. We can see here the 
impact of Reaganism with its implications that many of the people on 
welfare were simply lazy and taking advantage of the system. The use of 
such rhetoric may have been a deliberate tactic by Clinton and the DLC: as 
Republicans moved to the right under Reagan and even further to the right 
from 1994, the use of terms associated with the right may have been an 
attempt to capture the centre. 
In a number of speeches throughout 1990 and 1991, Clinton insisted on 
the need for a “modern, mainstream agenda” and used key terms like 
“expansion of opportunity”, “choice”, “responsibility and empowerment 
of poor people” and “reinventing government”. Like Dukakis before, he 
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developed the theme of economic management and competence. He 
repeatedly emphasized that the Republicans had run up a huge deficit and 
that only the Democrats could be trusted to provide capable economic 
supervision. The sign “It‟s the economy, stupid” became a symbol of the 
campaign. Over and over again Clinton targeted the middle class. He did 
not ignore the existence of poverty nor did he deny the need to offer 
government assistance but placed particular emphasis on limiting its 
duration and concentrating on the most vulnerable elements of society, 
notably children. These terms and themes would also appear in Britain and 
would occupy a large place in Tony Blair‟s rhetoric. 
Once he became president, his rhetoric reflected a certain conflict 
between his DLC motifs and more traditional Democratic themes like 
communitarianism and the need for government intervention. In his first 
inaugural address, predictably, he stressed the ideas of renewal and 
change: 
 
Today we celebrate the mystery of American renewal. This ceremony is 
held in the depth of winter, but by the words we speak and the faces we 
show the world, we force the spring, a spring reborn in the world‟s oldest 
democracy that brings forth the vision and courage to reinvent America. 
When our Founders‟ boldly declared America‟s independence to the world 
and our purposes to the Almighty, they knew that America, to endure, 
would have to change; not change for change‟s sake but change to preserve 
America‟s ideals: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Though we 
marched to the music of our time, our mission is timeless.26 
 
The themes here are traditional in American inaugural addresses, notably, 
the reference to the Founding Fathers and American democratic traditions, 
the invocation of God and, of course, the imagery of rebirth. Notice 
Clinton‟s acceptance of the idea that America has a special mission 
although he does not tell us what that mission is. 
His first State of the Union address showed more clearly the tensions 
between the Roosevelt tradition of the Democratic Party and the DLC‟s 
ideas.  Following logically from his campaign, he placed the greatest 
emphasis on economic policy. While he keeps to his earlier discourse on 
“opportunity” and “responsibility”, he makes sure to add a dose of 
“community” into the mixture: 
 
I believe we will find our new direction in the basic values that brought us 
here: opportunity, individual responsibility, community, work, family and 
faith. We need to break the old habits of both political parties in 
Washington. We must say that there can be no more something for 
nothing, and we are all in this together.27 
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Clinton here asserts that his political ideas, presumably those of the DLC, 
are genuinely new and different from those of traditional Democratic ones. 
In fact, he dismisses both parties equally–something which probably 
irritated members of Congress since many of them symbolized those “old 
habits”. His last sentence here keenly balances the DLC and the Roosevelt 
tradition: there should be no “Santa Claus state” giving things away to the 
unworthy but, on the other hand, we all have a responsibility for each 
other. The role of the state in helping its citizens is thus not denied but it is 
limited. Later in the speech he explicitly links it to the behaviour of those 
citizens: “I want to talk about what government can do, because I believe 
our government must do more for the hard-working people who pay its 
way.” In other words, the taxpayer needs to see a good return on his or her 
investment. The implication seems to be that if you do not work then you 
do not deserve assistance from the government. This, of course, reflects 
Clinton‟s repeated emphasis on reforming and limiting welfare (later in the 
speech he says that “after two years, they [those on welfare] must get back 
to work–in private business if possible; in public service, if necessary.” 
But note that he does not reject a role for government in putting people 
back to work. 
Of course, Clinton won the presidency without receiving a majority of 
the vote or increasing Democratic seats in Congress which placed him in a 
relatively weak position. Certainly the need to work with a Democratic 
Congress dominated by liberals and his desire to ensure the unity of the 
party, pushed him to the Left. Many of Clinton‟s first actions as president 
seemed closer to his days campaigning for McGovern than to this DLC 
rhetoric.  His first two years as president disappointed many in the DLC 
while not satisfying the liberal wing of the party. Public dissatisfaction 
with several of Clinton‟s initiatives–notably the failure of his health care 
plan and the controversy over his attempt to allow openly gay people to 
serve in the US Army–contributed to a Republican victory at the 
congressional elections in 1994. After this slap from the voters, Clinton 
moved even further to the right and his rhetoric shows this. In his first 
State of the Union address after the election, he said: “I think we all agree 
that we have to change the way the Government works. Let's make it 
smaller, less costly, and smarter; leaner, not meaner.”28 A Republican 
majority in Congress meant that there was little hope of new benefits and, 
indeed, Clinton finally agreed to sign a bill limiting the length of time one 
could remain on welfare. At the same time, he came under vicious attack 
over his personal life, leading to an impeachment hearing in Congress. In 
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such an atmosphere the legislative achievements of his last years in office 
were minimal.  
Let us then turn to examine the situation of Great Britain. In many 
ways the demographic evolution of the country resembles that of the 
United States with the growth of the middle class, the increasing advance 
of suburbanization and the development of what Margaret Thatcher called 
“popular capitalism”. The first person to use the term “property owning 
democracy” was also British, the economist J.E. Meade in 1964. Certainly 
the social and cultural upheavals of the 1960s, although obviously 
important, were less traumatic than in the United States as there was not 
the same drama of the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement. Great 
Britain also has not undergone as radical a change in its electoral map but 
this is, in part because the Labour Party had not had a notable success in 
winning with large majorities before Blair. On the other hand, although 
not as significant as in America, the racial question existed and was 
growing in magnitude as the Notting Hill riots of 1958, the impact of 
Enoch Powell and the Brixton and Toxteth riots of 1981 show. 
It is well known that, after Labour‟s defeat of 1979, when Margaret 
Thatcher came to power, the party moved to the left, choosing Michael 
Foot as leader and adopting certain positions viewed as too leftwing by 
moderate members.
29
 This provoked a rebellion by influential centrist 
members who created a new party, the Social Democrats (SDP). After a 
further defeat in 1983, in which Labour and the SDP each got about one-
quarter of the vote, the left-wing found itself largely discredited but their 
power within the party remained strong. The right-wing then began a slow 
campaign to win back control of the party. After Foot‟s resignation, Neil 
Kinnock became leader and he considered his primary objective to be 
returning the party to the centre. He believed in the need for a radical 
transformation of the party‟s policy, organisation and mentality, without 
which it would never come back to power. But divisions within the party 
forced him to proceed cautiously–especially during the first years of his 
leadership which were complicated by the miners‟ strike and the activities 
of Militant Tendency, a Trotskyite group in Liverpool. But the defeat of 
the miners and of Militant Tendency reinforced Kinnock and weakened 
the extreme left. He was also helped by the break-up of the Soviet Union 
which dramatically revealed the weaknesses of the Soviet economy and 
consecrated the triumph of capitalism and the market. Furthermore, the 
failure of socialist experiments by the French government from 1981-84 
also discredited the economic ideas of the extreme left. By the end of the 
1980s, most members of the Labour party were ready to accept the market 
economy.  In 1985, after the defeat of the miners‟ strike and coincidentally 
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in the same year as the founding of the DLC, Kinnock attacked.
30
 In a 
speech on the future of socialism, he started the process of redefining the 
policy of the party: certain of his ideas were entirely retaken later by Tony 
Blair. Kinnock stressed certain values like community and democracy 
rather than doctrinaire socialism. He even attacked the idea of 
nationalization and called for a “servant state”. In 1986 he published 
Making Our Way,  he even began to talk positively about capitalism and 
the market, although he saw them as needing reform and management.
31
 
Kinnock instituted a well publicized policy review which shed Labour‟s 
more extreme positions.
32
 By 1992, Labour had moderate policies and had 
done its best to attract media attention to them. The result, however, was a 
fourth election defeat in that year. It seemed that even a movement to the 
centre could not help Labour win and some began to despair that the party 
might never form a majority government again.
33
 In such a situation it is 
not surprising to see that Labour chose a more tradition-oriented leader in 
John Smith who slowed Kinnock‟s policies of change. Smith, however, 
died unexpectedly in 1994 and the young and reform-minded Tony Blair 
was chosen to replace him. 
In an influential article published in 1987, Anthony Heath and S. K. 
McDonald analysed the demographics of that year‟s election and 
concluded that social change since 1964 had reduced Labour‟s vote by 
five percent.
34
 At the same time the Conservatives‟ position had improved 
by four points. They also argued that the SDP/Liberal Alliance had 
benefited from the demographic situation, attracting much support from 
the middle class. Blair and many other Labour figures wholeheartedly 
accepted this analysis. Labour politician Giles Radice argued that “Labour 
cannot afford a class approach.”35 Coming to much the same conclusion as 
the DLC, Radice insisted that: 
 
[upwardly mobile families] do not believe that [Labour] understands, 
respects or rewards those who want to “get on”. Far from encouraging 
talent and promoting opportunity, Labour is seen as the party that is most 
likely to “take things away”. From the perspective of the aspirant voters, 
voting Labour is simply not “in their interests”.36 
 
Blair saw Labour‟s four election defeats as the voters‟ punishment for the 
party‟s failure to adapt to social and economic changes in British society. 
As we have already seen, Blair picked up themes already presented by 
Clinton in the US and Kinnock in the UK. As with Clinton, we can see the 
paradoxical assertion that something “new” was also a return to earlier 
ideas: “Labour has returned to its values and is now seeking the clearest 
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and most effective ways of putting them into practice”.37 In some strange 
way, “renewal” had become a synonym for “modernisation”. 
Certainly, “new” quickly became a key word for Blair. As Bill Clinton 
had talked of “New Democrats” so Blair began to speak of “New Labour” 
and “modernisation” became one of his mantras. But Blair also realized 
that he would need a significant gesture to signal major change and so he 
decided to repeal clause 4 of the Labour Party constitution which 
committed the party “to secure for the producers by hand or by brain the 
full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that 
may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of 
production of each industry or service” in other words to socialism. Blair 
succeeded in this and proceeded to develop a rhetoric of the centre for his 
party. 
From the start, Blair rejected ideology, insisting that the Labour Party 
had been founded to improve the living conditions of the mass of the 
population and not to promote socialism. In one speech, he argued that the 
1945 Labour government was the greatest peace-time government of the 
20
th
 century not because it introduced a socialist program but because it 
put into effect the British people‟s aspirations for a better existence.38 
This, indeed, should be the aim of government. According to Blair, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, many in Labour lost contact with the people‟s wishes 
and became obsessed by ideology and, for this reason, the party suffered 
four consecutive election defeats.
39
 Labour, Blair argued, had attracted 
voters because it had been a party of change but, over the years, the 
insistence on ideology had become a refusal of change. He described the 
Labour left as being “conservatives of the left” while he called for a 
“radicalism of the centre”.40  
Rhetorically, Blair has borrowed from the traditions of the Liberal 
Party, echoing both Gladstone and Lloyd George at times. He made a 
point to laud the achievements of past Liberal reformers at the Labour 
celebrations for the 50
th
 anniversary of the Attlee government: 
 
The ultimate objective is a new political consensus of the left-of-centre, 
based around the key values of democratic socialism and European social 
democracy, firm in its principles but capable of responding to changing 
times, so that these values may be put into practice and secure broad 
support to govern for long periods of time. To reach that consensus we 
must value the contribution of Lloyd George, Beveridge and Keynes [all 
noted Liberals] and not just Attlee, Bevan or Crosland. We should start to 
explore our own history with fresh understanding and an absence of 
preconceptions.41 
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The key terms here are “consensus” and “broad support”. Blair presents 
his philosophy as one of pragmatism: be flexible, adapt to change, and 
respond to what the voters want. At all costs avoid an ideological 
straitjacket. To make his point even clearer, Blair also echoed the 
Conservatives: 
 
So, yes, there has been a revolution inside the Labour party. We have 
rejected the worst of our past, and rediscovered the best. And in 
rediscovering the best of our past, we have made ourselves fit to face 
the future, and fit to govern in the future. There is a big idea here. It is 
about creating a society that is genuinely One Nation in which we seek 
to realise the potential of all our people.42 
 
Once again we see the idea that only by keeping to the values of the past 
can one create a good future. Note his use of the term “One nation”, an 
expression strongly associated with the Conservatives. Blair certainly 
demonstrates here his sympathy with certain strands of Conservative 
thought and his fascination with Margaret Thatcher (although one would 
never associate the term “one nation” with her) is well-known–to such an 
extent that Anthony Seldon devoted one chapter of his biography of Blair 
to the subject.
43
 In one pamphlet, Blair went so far as to commend some 
aspects of the Thatcher government, saying: 
 
Some of its reforms were, in retrospect, necessary acts of modernisation, 
particularly the exposure of much of the state industrial sector to reform 
and competition.44 
 
Notice his praise of “competition” in particular. Of course, he immediately 
counters this by attacking the Thatcher government which he accuses of 
“damaging key national services, notably education and health”.  
Blair, in fact likes to say that his socialism is moral and not economic: 
 
Since the collapse of communism, the ethical basis of socialism is the 
only one that has stood the test of time. This socialism is based on a 
moral assertion that individuals are interdependent, that they owe 
duties to one another as well as to themselves, that the good society 
backs up the efforts of the individuals within it, and that common 
humanity demands that everyone be given a platform on which to 
stand.45 
 
He is not egalitarian but communitarian for he continually talks about the 
importance of the community with which the individual evolves. Blair 
likes to underline the need for cooperation between all members of society 
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in order to assure a well functioning economy–for, like the Democrats, 
New Labour stresses its economic competence. In an early speech to the 
TUC, Blair subscribed to the following principle: 
 
Business and employees, your members, aren‟t two nations divided. 
That‟s old style thinking. That‟s the thinking of the past. Britain works 
best when business and unions work together.46 
 
The citizen, Blair also believes, has rights as well as duties towards other 
citizens and so, as with Clinton, we find the lexical field of responsibility. 
Like the Democrats, Blair picked up on fears of law-breaking, famously 
saying that he would be “tough on crime; tough on the causes of crime”. 
Blair has always insisted on the need to maintain the welfare state and 
he certainly has significantly increased spending in certain areas, most 
notably the health service. But he does not want to be considered as hostile 
to the rich. In a speech on social justice in 1994, Blair observed: 
 
Because we [Labour] were anti-poverty, we were portrayed as anti-
wealth. Because we were concerned with lifting up the less successful, 
we were seen as attacking those who aspired to do better. 
Because we campaigned for adequate benefits, we were said to be 
unconcerned about the working poor who were taxed to pay for 
benefits. Because we wanted to defend the welfare state, people came 
to assume that we did not think it could be improved. We were seen as 
interested more in protecting the gains of the past, rather than building 
on them. 
 
But like Clinton he sees the need for changes and for limiting certain 
benefits. 
Blair won a large victory in 1997 and immediately began work on an 
important series of reforms, notably in the constitutional domain. In part 
because of the differing nature of the political systems, Blair enjoyed 
significantly greater success than Clinton. Realising that an emphasis on 
newness and moderation became more difficult once in power, Blair 
sought to present himself and his party in somewhat different terms. His 
first attempt became known as the famous “Third Way”. According to 
Blair: 
 
The Third Way is not an attempt to split the difference between Right and 
Left. It is about traditional values in a changed world.47 
 
So, once again newness is a return to tradition.  But the term “Third Way” 
was found to confuse voters and largely disappeared from Labour 
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discourse in subsequent years.
48
 Blair made a number of other attempts 
after this but none were particularly successful. Blair became obsessed 
with framing political discourse and came to believe in the need for 
permanent campaigning. As Labour Party adviser, Philip Gould, 
explained: 
 
You must always seek to gain and keep momentum, or it will pass 
immediately to your opponent. Gaining momentum means dominating the 
news agenda, entering the new cycle at the earliest possible time, and 
repeatedly re-entering it, with stories and initiatives so that subsequent 
news coverage is set on your terms.49 
 
The problem, though, was that the press quickly became sceptical about 
New Labour‟s spin and began to report critically on Blair‟s 
announcements–to the point of even questioning whether Cherie Blair‟s 
pregnancy was a political manoeuvre. This cynicism was then 
communicated to the public who started to distrust Labour–a feeling which 
only increased after the invasion of Iraq and revelations of how the 
government had misrepresented information. It did not, however, stop 
Labour from being re-elected in 2001 and 2005. 
But, in the end, how “new” are New Labour and the New Democrats? 
And how does their rhetoric relate to their actual policy positions and 
actions in power? It has to be stated that most elements of the DLC 
programme are acceptable to the liberals, which may help explain the 
failure of the Left to make an effective counter attack. The New 
Democrats supported welfare reform but wanted it to be achieved through 
greater investment in education and job training. They called for more 
environmental protection, supported abortion, family leave, hand gun 
control and national health care. As Jim Hale has pointed out, they differ 
mainly from liberals in the areas of trade and affirmative action. He has 
even argued that: “the DLC has fleshed out a liberal-leaning platform 
couched in soothing centrist rhetoric.”50 Certainly the first two years of the 
Clinton presidency can be used to argue such a position. 
The same argument can be made in relation to New Labour. Blair 
continually proclaimed that his party had definitely broken from the past, 
and many agreed with him, seeing New Labour as an extension of 
Thatcherism.
51
 It did not take long for reassessments to emerge and a 
number of scholars began to question how different from the Labour past 
it really was. David Rubinstein, for example, argued that Blair‟s objectives 
were little different from those of the Attlee or Wilson governments.
52
 
Steven Fielding even said of the revision of Clause Four: 
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Widely hailed as New Labour‟s defining moment, this involved deleting 
from the party‟s constitution words that enjoyed nothing more than a 
questionable relevance. They were moreover replaced by another set of 
words that still allowed the possibility of state ownership. Furthermore, 
while the new clause endorsed the market, that was something party 
leaders had done decades before. Consequently, if the revision of Clause 
Four was the ultimate expression of “New” Labour, then “New” Labour 
was nothing new.53 
 
Certainly Blair‟s governments focussed on a number of issues traditionally 
associated with the Left, such as health and education and sharply 
increased social spending (especially health care). Blair himself repeatedly 
said that education as his top priority, although he continued such Thatcher 
and Major reforms as a national curriculum and key stage tests (which 
Labour had initially opposed). With regard to social policy, the Blair 
governments did make some attempt at lowering income inequality which 
had grown during the Thatcher years. Blair chose to focus on target 
groups, notably children and pensioners, and did have some success in 
improving their living standards.
54
 Certainly Blair made no major changes 
like those of the post-war Labour government and was content with 
piecemeal improvements to social welfare, sharing much of the philosophy 
of the New Democrats. However, this does not make New Labour “new”–
a significant and usually dominant proportion of the party since 1951 had 
always believed that after Attlee, the emphasis should be on improvements 
to what already existed than in the creation of new structures. So, as in the 
case of Clinton‟s New Democrats, it can certainly be argued that the 
emphasis on novelty and modernisation was primarily a rhetorical device. 
Let us now consider how successful the move to the centre was for 
both the Democrats and Labour. A 2001 poll showed that voters saw 
Blair‟s party as preoccupied by the middle class and their interests.55 
However a detailed analysis by Heath, Jowell and Curtice established that 
Labour support had already started to grow under John Smith among 
voters who saw themselves as centrists–and thus before Blair began his 
ideological repositioning.
56
 On the other hand, they found that: 
 
In contrast, between 1994 and 1997 Tony Blair and New Labour lost 
ground somewhat on the left, made only modest gains on the centre-left, 
and had their largest gains on the right of the spectrum. Unlike the 1979-83 
and the 1992-4 periods, when gains and losses tended to take an across-
the-board character, the 1994-97 gains were highly unevenly distributed 
and we have no hesitation in attributing them to New Labour‟s ideological 
shift rather than to its perceived competence (or to the Conservatives‟ 
perceived incompetence).57 
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Their conclusion then is that New Labour did, indeed, draw some support 
from the Conservatives. But, as Pippa Norris has pointed out, resolutely 
occupying the centre has been “both a blessing and a curse”. She argues 
that it has been “the bedrock of his popular success and yet the limit of 
what he can do with his popularity” for being a centrist does not make one 
an inspiring visionary or give a candidate a mandate for “radical policy 
change” which will ensure a place in history.58 
Evidence is less clear in relation to the New Democrats. Exit polls 
show that in 1992 Clinton had higher support than Dukakis among the 
white middle class but the difference was small–only  one or two 
percent.
59
 Congressional Quarterly, in its analysis of the 1992 election, 
found that social class was not a major factor: 
 
Except for race, all of the social factors we have examined–region, union 
membership, social class, and religion–have declined in importance during 
the postwar years. The decline in regional differences directly parallels the 
increase in racial differences.... The Democratic Party‟s appeals to blacks 
may have weakened its hold on white groups that traditionally supported 
it... But the erosion of democratic support among union members, the 
working class and Catholics results from other factors as well. During the 
postwar years, these groups have changed... Differences in income 
between the working class and the middle class have diminished.60 
 
It would seem, therefore, that the New Democrats‟ demographic analysis 
was correct. The problem, though, is that Congressional Quarterly can 
find little evidence of their strategy working. The Democrats did, indeed, 
increase their percentage of the vote among the white working class and 
other target groups but “the Democrats won with lower absolute levels of 
support among most of these groups than they had won in previous 
Democratic victories.”61 Clinton‟s election in 1992 has usually been seen 
more as a criticism of Bush and the result of a three-way race than a 
positive endorsement of the Democrat. 
The 1994 congressional elections were a complete disaster for the 
Democrats. Clinton analysed the problem as being fundamentally one of 
communication which the Republicans, thanks to their Contract with 
America, had been better at. According to Clinton: “From 1994 on... the 
side without a national message would sustain unnecessary losses.”62 He 
did admit to a series of mistakes, stating in his memoirs that he should 
have postponed health care reform when a Republican filibuster became 
clear and concentrated instead on welfare reform which “would have been 
popular with alienated middle-class Americans who voted in droves for 
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Republicans.”63 By not doing so he believed this allowed the media to 
amplify his errors: “my victories were minimized, my losses were 
magnified, and the overall impression was created that I as just another 
pro-tax, big-government liberal, not the New Democrat who had won the 
presidency.”64 So his analysis was clear: the Democrats lost because of his 
failure to embrace strongly the New Democratic programme and 
communicate this effectively to the public. Sen. Diane Feinstein agreed: 
“We Democrats have listened to the 15 percent of the people who had no 
[health insurance] coverage. Republicans listened to the 85 percent of the 
people who had coverage.”65 But in spite of his subsequent move to the 
centre, his signing of the Republican welfare reform bill and a booming 
economy, in 1996 Clinton failed to get a majority of the popular vote with 
only 49 percent supporting him. Congressional Quarterly did, however see 
an “increasing part of the middle class voting Democratic in that 
election”.66 At the same time, though, the Democrats gained only eight 
seats in the House and actually lost two in the Senate.  
In the period since 2000 profound differences have developed between 
eh two countries. To begin with, if the impeachment of Clinton had 
revealed deep polarisation in the U.S., the contested presidency of George 
W. Bush made the situation worse. The Iraq War played a major role here. 
Discourse related to this conflict was examined in some detail in the 
companion volume to this book, Foreign Policy Discourse in the “New 
World Order” in the United States and the United Kingdom so it will not 
be considered in any depth here. Its impact, however, in motivating and 
radicalizing the American Left should not be underestimated. The 
rejection of the Iraq War, torture, and Guantanamo Bay discredited the 
Republicans among many voters and encouraged the Democratic victory 
at the congressional elections in 2006. When added to a growing economic 
crisis, it led to victory for the Democrats in the presidential election of 
2008 as well. The election of the first black president in American history 
was an immensely significant development but it has led to greater 
polarisation in political discourse. 
Although Britain has not experienced as strong a polarisation, it has 
other things in common with the United States, notably the Iraq War. Tony 
Blair resigned as Prime Minister in June 2007 having lost much of his 
popularity because of his enthusiastic support for the invasion of Iraq. He 
was replaced by his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. Brown‟s 
major advantage probably was that he had been the architect of economic 
policy and, thus, of the prosperity of the time. When the economic crisis 
came, Brown found himself in a difficult position because he had to justify 
his own economic decisions and, therefore, could not return to traditional 
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Labour rhetoric. He did try at times to strike a populist tone, notably when 
asking for a special tax on bonuses, but he was continually hampered by 
his own past rhetoric and championship of the market. His language has 
been carefully balanced: 
 
The first choice was this: whether markets left to themselves could sort out 
the crisis; or whether governments had to act. Our choice was clear: we 
nationalised Northern Rock and took shares in British banks, and as a 
result not one British saver has lost a single penny. That was the change we 
chose. The change that benefits the hard working majority, not the 
privileged few. 
And we faced a second big choice–between letting the recession run its 
course, or stimulating the economy back to growth. And we made our 
choice: help for small businesses, targeted tax cuts for millions and 
advancing our investment in roads, rail and education. That was the change 
we chose–change that benefits the hard working majority and not just a 
privileged few.67 
 
Here we see several of Blair‟s favourite terms: “choice”, “change”, “hard 
working majority”, “small businesses” and “tax cuts”. But they are offset 
by traditional Labour themes like nationalisation and by a repeated attack 
on “a privileged few”. It is one of the obvious differences between British 
and American left-wing rhetoric that, while Obama took the same actions 
as Brown with regard to the banks, he would never have dared to use the 
word “nationalisation”. Brown, unlike pre-Blair Labour leaders, does not 
present nationalisation as something good but as the necessary response to 
a major crisis. The decision was made not in the interests of ideology but 
in those of “British savers”. Let us also examine his use of “privileged 
few”. Looking at earlier New Labour and New Democrat rhetoric one has 
the impression–although this is never clearly stated–that if a privileged 
few exists it consists not of the rich but of certain unspecified elements of 
the non-working poor, which obviously has a link with Reaganism. With 
the current economic crisis, “the privileged few” seems to be once again, 
the rich–or at least certain of them. 
Often electorates turn to the left in times of economic crisis but given 
Labour‟s own role in the period leading up to the crisis, this has not 
occurred. In the elections of May 2010, Nick Clegg and the Liberal 
Democrats clearly hoped to capitalize on disillusionment with both Labour 
and the Conservatives but obviously failed to do so. The results showed 
some fear at the idea of the Conservatives returning to power, a loss of 
confidence in Labour, and an uncertainty about any other possibility. All 
of this, of course, complicates economic recovery and makes twice as 
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difficult Labour‟s search for an effective discourse in the present 
atmosphere. 
The economic crisis has also had an impact on discourse in the United 
States. Certainly there have been a number of attacks on Wall Street and 
the nation‟s economic aristocracy but Obama‟s criticisms have been 
notably tepid. In a major speech on financial reform, his moderation was 
evident: 
 
I believe in the power of the free market.  I believe in a strong financial 
sector that helps people to raise capital and get loans and invest their 
savings.  That‟s part of what has made America what it is.  But a free 
market was never meant to be a free license to take whatever you can get, 
however you can get it.  That‟s what happened too often in the years 
leading up to this crisis.  Some–and let me be clear, not all–but some on 
Wall Street forgot that behind every dollar traded or leveraged there‟s a 
family looking to buy a house, or pay for an education, open a business, 
save for retirement.  What happens on Wall Street has real consequences 
across the country, across our economy.68 
 
This is a weaker criticism than Roosevelt‟s, although not fundamentally 
different. The basic point is the same: some are abusing the system and 
average people are suffering because of it. The function of government, 
especially at the national level, is to prevent this from happening. But 
while Obama‟s rhetoric has been notably mild, his administration has 
achieved a remarkable amount in Congress: the stimulus bill, student loan 
reform, credit card reform and, of course, major health care reform which 
had eluded many past presidents. 
All of this leads one to believe that political rhetoric is extremely fluid 
and, indeed, limited and repetitive. Tony Blair uses terms associated with 
Margaret Thatcher and other Conservatives. Clinton appropriates right-
wing rhetoric while the Republican right re-uses radical leftwing 
terminology in a totally different context. While there are some ideas and 
expressions associated with one party more than another, this can change. 
If something seems to succeed, to appeal to people, then the other party 
will borrow it–although they tend to adapt it a bit. The essential motivation 
for any political party is to win elections. If one party fails to do so for a 
long period of time, they will obviously study the methods and rhetoric of 
the winning party and try to adjust theirs to make it more attractive to the 
voters. Both Britain and the United States have tended towards the right 
since the 1970s for a number of reasons, demographic, and political, 
among others and, in order to win, the left (at least some of it) has tried to 
adjust its policies and rhetoric to this situation. 
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What this brief study has tried to show is that, while there are 
important differences between the two nations, there is a remarkable 
similarity in the development of political ideas.  The New Democrats and 
New Labour developed at the same time after suffering a similar period of 
electoral disappointment. In both cases, their discourse moved to the 
centre in an attempt to woo voters and they both made a show of breaking 
from past party orthodoxy and instituting something new. However, it 
would be wrong to imagine that past rhetoric was significantly more 
incendiary or oriented towards class warfare or that policy changed 
dramatically. The speeches and the policies of past Democratic or Labour 
leaders have not been significantly different from those of New Labour or 
the New Democrats. Politics is the art of the possible certainly, but it is 
also the art of repackaging the old and presenting it as the new. 
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